that the Army could participate in the POLARIS program, particularly nose cone and G&C. For these reasons, a Navy Liaison Office was maintained at the Army agency, but for all practical purposes the Navy was severed from the Army program 43 . Departure of the Navy placed the Army IRBM program in a precarious position, for, coupled with the Secretary's decision in this respect, his roles and mission statement of November presented a situation wherein the Army was developing a missile that it could not employ. Douglas Aircraft Company was already in the process of developing the SM-75 THOR for the Air Force, and in December 1956 there was uncertainty as to whether or not the Air  Force wanted another IRBM. The Army's in-house development prospects in early 1957 did not appear "bright."     IV. OPERATIONAL CONTROL TO THE AIR FORCE When Mr. Wilson's roles and missions decision was made in November 1956 and the JUPITER was placed under Air Force operational control, there were  no unusual or particular problems that would have impaired the effectiveness of the ABMA missile development team. This group had already been  engaged in solving the highly complex problems of naval missilery, and the Air Force employment requirements would be very similar, with some  exception, to those the Army had conceived.    _____________________________

43. DF, Chf, Navy Off, ABMA to CG, ABMA, 11 Dec 56, subj: Reorganization of Navy Off at ABMA, Hist Off files.