thereafter AFBMD forwarded to ABMA some 66 requests for alterations to GSE that had been conceived by the Agency. Then, in November, the first training conference was held at AFBMD 51 . After this, it appeared that the JUPITER program for the first time in its history was on the road toward employment as a tactical weapon system. When the go-ahead was given for JUPITER development, ABMA was actually involved in three high priority projects, so careful planning to accomplish these tasks was a must. As to the sequence of importance, AEC's HARDTACK project was given first priority, and, then, in succeeding order, maintenance of the JUPITER firing schedule and preliminary actions leading to a possible satellite program. With regard to the JUPITER portion, the President's decision had outlined the specific goals. The overriding objective was the successful achievement of an IRBM with a 1,500-mile range reasonable accuracy. Related problems such as ground support, contradictory service employment concepts, and increased range were not to delay the basic goal. This was an order to go to work with one aim in mind, and General Medaris warned his personnel not to take any actions outside these areas 52 . In view of the urgency indicated in the go-ahead directive, by November 1957 General Medaris had made a number of recommendations to Secretary Brucker as to the manner in which an early operational capability could be attained. He suggested that the JUPITER be released for production with mobile  _____________________________

51. Ibid,: JUP Chronology 52. DF, Cont Off, ABMA to Comdr, ABMA, et. al., 17 Oct 57, subj: Priorities Within ABMA, Hist Off files.