Other matters of immediate concern involved the size of the program and the employment concept. Before these were resolved, a considerable expense was  incurred because of the frequency requirements to effect over-all program revisions. At the outset, it appeared that the JUPITER would be a four-squadron  program, and that each squadron would be mobile and capable of periodic movement to alternate sites to complicate the enemy attack problem. In August 1958,  however, it was learned that the Secretary of the Air Force had designated $225 million for FY 1959 in the JUPITER portion of the IRBM program rather than $299  million that had been programmed by ABMA. This meant that only a three-squadron program was planned, as opposed to the four; although it was October  before this fact was known. Almost paralleling this action was a USAF notification on 12 November 1958 to the effect that tactical mobility was no longer  considered a part of the program. A clue to this situation had been received some two months before when SAC changed the deployment plans for the first  squadron to two launch positions of three emplacements each. All through the time frame covered in these changes, ABMA had been forced to program and  reprogram because of the piecemeal way the information came to the Agency. With regard to the mobility part, termination costs for contracts already in force  were rather high. Thus, in reality, two years had elapsed before ABMA could determine the exact direction that the JUPITER program would pursue. After that, the  requirement still existed to conclude the government-to-government and technical agreements. This had a serious effect on ABMA training plans and facilities 60 .  _____________________________

60. Hist, ABMA, Jul-Dec 58, pp. 8-11; Major Decisions Affecting the /JUP/ Prog.