were salient questions to be answered. These involved the degree of accuracy that could be achieved, reliability of guidance systems that might be employed, and whether or not problems in either case could be speedily resolved 7 . This was but one move in the slightly quickened pace leading toward action, for, on 25 March, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 (Training), recommended the initiation of the 1,000 to 1,500 mile missile development program. Additionally, CONARC began reviewing and updating its 1954 conceptions. Proposals for short range remained the same, with the 75-mile SERGEANT being considered as the best solution to meet this requirement. In the medium-range field, development of a 250-mile missile was proposed to replace the suggested 150-mile weapon. As for long-range missiles, CONARC did not make a specific suggestion. The 250-mile missile, to their thinking, deleted the 500-mile requirement; however, they believed that the Army did require the ability to attack targets with nuclear warheads at extremely long range 8 . By May 1955, Redstone Arsenal completed the study that had been directed by OCO in January. Basically, this involved three missiles, the larger of which was an IRBM. No commitments were immediately forthcoming from this or any of the other preceding proposals, but at this point recommendations from widespread sources were centering on the requirement for a long-range missile of the IRBM class.  Redstone Arsenal quite firmly believed that it had the  capability to accomplish such development, so, in ______________________________

7. House Rpt Nr 67, 0p. cit., p. 21; Memo, Dep Chf R&D to OCO, 1 Mar 55, subj: Medium Range Ball Msls, cited in DA Pam 70-10, p. 118 8. DA Pam 70-10, p. 118; Memo, CONARC to OCRD, 2 Apr 55, subj: Surface-to-Surface GM Rqmts for Spt of Corps & Larger Units, cited in DA Pam 70-10, p. 38