effort to secure approval to employ the system.  OSD- BMC appeared to accept the concepts, but the Assistant Secretary of Defense withheld $6.8 million proposed for FY 1957 GSE funds, and contended  that ABMA had no mission to develop GSE. This decision left the Agency with permission to develop just enough GSE to support the development program and train a small cadre of Army and Navy personnel. Thus, other than a research and development mission, operational employment and training plans were at an impasse 97 . Notwithstanding this apparent block, ABMA acted in November 1956 to establish a separate division for training with a specific responsibility for heavy  ballistic missile troop training. Ironically, the Training Division began to function on 26 November, the date of the Wilson roles and missions memo. Not  only did the Agency have to struggle to get a training plan formulated, but they had to fight for the very life of the JUPITER program. In keeping with the  classic "one- two" pattern, the Navy dropped out of the JUPITER development program shortly after the Secretary's decision, and it began to appear unlikely that a training program would ever get under way. Despite the bleak outlook, the new Training Division moved along as efficiently as the situation would allow. For example, they investigated requirements  for Ordnance officer training and prepared a tentative training outline, identified specific skills that were necessary to attain missile specialty ratings, arranged for instructor factory training, and provided OJT instruction in the ABMA laboratories. With these efforts a _____________________________

97. JUP Story, prepared by Gen Medaris for S/A, l4 Dec 59, Hist Off files.