HISTORY - Page 19
thing, the diameter of the JUPITER was 105 inches as
compared with 70 inches for the REDSTONE, and
special rigging was required. Moreover, fabrication
was not limited to the JUPITER per se, for that missile
was still a considerable time away from a frozen
configuration. There were other test vehicles such as
JUPITER A's and C's. This meant the likelihood of
almost simultaneous work on several missiles that
were of varying configurations, or even work stopped
on one particular missile until component redesign
could be effected on deficient parts discovered by the
labs. Working space was a vital necessity
26
.
It is relatively simple to identify the source of the
facility construction difficulty, as the slow pace was
caused by the DOD roles and missions decision of
November 1956, which, in part, stated that
construction projects in support of anti-aircraft and
ballistic missiles within the Army were being deferred
without prejudice and returned for re-justification
under the new ground rules (limitation of Army
employment of missiles of 200-mile range and under).
In reality, the FY 1957 MCA program did not feel the
complete impact of this decision, for $15 million was
already under contract, but the proposed FY 1958
MCA program was dealt a "body blow" with little time
for reclama by Ordnance
27
. Eventually, the late 1957
DOD decision to develop both IRBMs brought
construction more in line with requirements.
Management
Because of the scope of the development program
and the charge to accomplish the task with speed,
effective program management was a must. The
Agency Commanding General was armed with
unusual
__________________________
26. MFR, Col J. G. Zierdt, Chf, ABMA Cont Off, 28 Apr 56, subj: FY 57 MCA Constr in the JUP Prog, in ABMA Ref Book,
subj: Facil, MCA.
27. Msg, no citation, COFORD to ABMA, 28 Nov 58, subj: MCA FY 58 - Review of GM Facil, in ABMA Ref Book,
subj: Facil, MCA.