thing, the diameter of the JUPITER was 105 inches as compared with 70 inches for the REDSTONE, and special rigging was required. Moreover, fabrication was not limited to the JUPITER per se, for that missile was still a considerable time away from a frozen configuration. There were  other test vehicles such as JUPITER A's and C's. This meant the likelihood of almost simultaneous work on several missiles that were of varying configurations, or even work stopped on one particular missile until component redesign could be effected on deficient parts discovered by the labs. Working space was a vital necessity 26 . It is relatively simple to identify the source of the facility construction difficulty, as the slow pace was caused by the DOD roles and missions decision of November 1956, which, in part, stated that construction projects in support of anti-aircraft and ballistic missiles within the Army were being deferred without prejudice and returned for re-justification under the new ground rules (limitation of Army employment of missiles of 200-mile range and under). In reality, the FY 1957 MCA program did not feel the complete impact of this decision, for $15 million was already under contract, but the proposed FY 1958 MCA program was dealt a "body blow" with little time for reclama by Ordnance 27 . Eventually, the late 1957 DOD decision to develop both IRBMs brought construction more in line with requirements. Management Because of the scope of the development program and the charge to accomplish the task with speed, effective program management was a must. The Agency Commanding General was armed with unusual  __________________________

26. MFR, Col J. G. Zierdt, Chf, ABMA Cont Off, 28 Apr 56, subj: FY 57 MCA Constr in the JUP Prog, in ABMA Ref Book, subj: Facil, MCA. 27. Msg, no citation, COFORD to ABMA, 28 Nov 58, subj: MCA FY 58 - Review of GM Facil, in ABMA Ref Book, subj: Facil, MCA.