authority, that is, for a field commander, to carry out the order, but a chain of command still existed to assure that decisions were carried out in the best interest of the program. At the top of program control was DOD's Ballistic Missile Committee (BMC) and, thence, downward to JANBMC. Subsequently, after the pull out by the Navy, the joint group was re- designated the Army Ballistic Missile Committee (ABMC). This management tier provided higher review authority and program control. Management at the working level was also an important factor. It was imperative that the organization have "on-the-spot" technical competence for every  facet of the development program, and thus the headquarters staff was organized somewhat differently than normal. Extensive coordination usually  breeds delay, so the move was made to bring the experts of the various technical services and other organizations to the development installation. In this  respect, COE, Transportation Corps, and Signal Corps were represented. Besides this, representatives of the combat arms and pertinent Department of  Army staff office were domiciled at ABMA. These individuals served in dual roles - staff members of ABMA and representatives in the interests of their  parent organizations. Direct communications were made possible with all necessary sources, which reduced the reaction time in settling specific technical  problems. This cooperation promoted early and valid decisions with regard to program direction 28 . ______________________________

28.  Hist Monograph Nr 3, subj: Spec Powers Delegated to the CG of the ABMA, 1 Feb 56-31 Mar 58, Feb 61, pp. 4-7 &13-16. Appendix 4 provides the organizational structure under which ABMA functioned during the Army-Navy cooperative period.