By August, decision time was nearing, so the Secretary of Defense set up art ad hoc committee, comprised of Mr. W. M. Holaday from his office, General Medaris, and General Schriever, to work out a single land-based IRBM program. All aspects of both systems were to be studied, with particular attention being given to basic missile design, over-all program status, and manufacturing and test facilities contributing to the development program. After careful deliberation, the committee was to make a recommendation to the Secretary by 15 September. While this study was in progress, explicit guidelines were given for program operations in being. ABMA was told not to commit funds for missiles or missile components beyond those needed to meet a production rate of one missile per month. In turn, lead time commitments for procurement would be limited to 12 months. Anything beyond that time frame, whether it was procurement of development activity, should be suspended or canceled. ABMA and contractor personnel were also limited to an overtime rate of three per cent, with the exception of personnel directly connected with static and flight testing 47 . To ABMA's thinking, the Secretary's decision had an adverse impact upon the effectiveness of the Agency's operations. For example, Genera Medaris felt  that the three per cent limitation reduced his work force at a rate equal to 1,000 people. This meant that the Agency would be operating at a relative  strength of 65 per cent, which, in turn, threatened a number of programs. For example, it was likely that ABMA participation in the Atomic Energy  Commission's (AEC) Project HARDTACK would be canceled if the Agency were unable _____________________________

47. Memo, S/D to S/A, 13 Aug 57, subj: IRBM Pro, Hist Off files.